The first part of the course sets the ground to the functionalist theory of
mind. The combination between the latter and the Turing’s theory of
computation amounts to be the theoretical foundation of classical
cognitive science. However, also more recent developments of cognitive
science are rooted in that combination, in particular the topics of our
course: mind studies from a multidisciplinary perspective, between
philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. Then, in the first part we will
examine some aspects of the traditional philosophical debate on modern
scientific revolution: (a) the rise of modern mechanicistic approaches to
the physical world: Galilei’s scientific methodology, Descartes’ scientific
methodology; materialism and physicalism; reductionism and antireductionism;
ontological emergence, epistemic emergence
(supervenience); (b) the conceptual tension between Descartes’
mechanistic approach to the res-extensa and his non-mechanistic
approach to res-cogitans, the mind-body problem; (c) a short story of the
mind-body problem up to the functionalist theory of mind.
In the second part of the course we will examine how the combination
between functionalist theory of mind and Turing computational theory
(combination delivered by Hilary Putnam during the sixties) produces a
notion of cognitive unconscious quite different from the Freudian one: the
unconscious in this case has computational properties. Mind is a
functional system, much the same as a Turing machine and mental
states and processes are computations on representations. In order to
investigate this notion of computational unconscious I consider two types
of neurocognitive disorder –“blindsight” and “neglect” – which both
reveal how, under certain conditions, conscious and unconscious
activities of the brain can functionally separate. However, this functional
separation does not compromise the correct functioning of the
unconscious elaboration of information. In the two particular cases
mentioned above the functional dissociation is between the
consciousness of seeing and the unconscious elaboration of visual
information. The study of these two types of functional dissociation is the
tool by which we can analyze the more general distinction – delivered by
Dennett – between personal and subpersonal levels of mental
functioning. Dennett’s distinction underlies the entire conceptual
landscape in which the nature of the bond between conscious and
unconscious mental activities is debated. Shortly, by examining these
issues, we will be heading to the study of two books in the bibliography.
On the one side, Dehaene’s work flips the traditional Cartesian model of
consciousness: the starting point of the work is a theory of the
unconscious built on the studies of cognitive dissociative disorders. The
main goal is that of delivering a theory of consciousness that fits that
model of unconscious activities of mind. Dehaene naturalizes the notion
of consciousness by using the language and the methodologies of
cognitive neuroscience. In other words, according to this reductionist
approach, consciousness, far from being the primitive data of a theory of
mind, is the emerging byproduct of the computational unconscious
activities of mind. On the other side, still into the light of the studies of
the dissociative disorders mentioned above, Wegner’s work delivers an
eliminative account of consciousness. The traditional idea of an individual
represented as a free, responsible and aware agent, along which the idea
that consciousness can have a causal role in determining individual
choices, are critically analyzed. The outcome of his analysis can be
summarized by saying that our conscious will is an illusion. The works of
Dehane and Wegner are kept together by the theory of introspection of
Peter Carruthers, According to this theory, the neurocognitive model of
Dehaene provides a suitable framework within which the data on
confabulation analyzed by Wegner can be naturally developed.